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Abstract—We study the secure degrees of freedom
(d.o.f.) of the MISO compound wiretap channel. The
transmitter has M antennas, whereas the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper each have one antenna
and the channel vectors take one of ﬁnitely many values.
If the number of states of either the legitimate receiver
or the eavesdropper channel is less than M, then then we
achieve full 1 d.o.f. If however the number of states of
both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper channel
are at-least equal to M, then we establish that the d.o.f. is
strictly less than 1. Our upper bound is, to our knowledge,
the ﬁrst bound which is strictly tighter than the “pairwise
upper bound”. Lower bounds that combine ideas based
on time-sharing, noise transmission, signal alignment and
multi-level coding schemes are also provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel, introduced in [1] is an informa-
tion theoretic model for secure communications at the
physical layer. In this model, there are three terminals
— a sender, a receiver and an eavesdropper. A wiretap
code simultaneously ensures reliable communication
to the legitimate receiver and secrecy with respect
to the eavesdropper. In recent times that has been a
signiﬁcant interest in applying this model to wireless
communication systems. Some recent works include
secure communications over fading channels [2]–[4],
multi-antenna wiretap channels [5]–[13] and several
multiuser channels.
The wiretap channel model assumes that the eaves-
dropper’s channel statistics are known to all the termi-
nals. As one justiﬁcation, when the receiver channels
are degraded, the wiretap code can be designed for the
worst-case eavesdropper in a class. However in many
cases of practical interest, such as in the case of multi-
antenna channels, the receivers cannot be ordered in
this fashion and it is not possible to characterize the
worst-case eavesdropper.
A model that incorporates the lack of knowledge
of the receiver channels is a compound extension of
the wiretap channel. In the model studied in [14] the
channels of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdrop-
per take one of ﬁnitely many values. The problem
is equivalent to broadcasting a common message to
multiple intended receivers while keeping the message
secure against a collection of non-colluding eaves-
droppers. A lower bound on the secrecy capacity is
established which amounts to sending information at
a rate such that that the worst legitimate receiver can
decode while every eavesdropper channel remains in
(asymptotically) perfect equivocation. One immediate
upper bound to capacity is the pairwise upper bound.
This bound essentially (c.f. (51)) considers all pos-
sible receiver-eavesdropper pairs and selects the pair
with smallest capacity assuming all other receivers are
absent. This bound coincides with the coding scheme
in [14] when the underlying channels are deterministic
and the legitimate receiver has only one realization.
The pairwise upper bound is also tight for parallel
reversely degraded wiretap channels when there is
one legitimate receiver and multiple eavesdroppers [3],
[15] or when there are multiple receivers and one
eavesdropper [2]. Other recent works on the compound
wiretap channel include [16], [17].
To the best of our knowledge, no upper bounds
besides the pairwise upper bound are known for the
compound wiretap channel. All the conclusive capacity
results previously used the pairwise upper bound in the
converse and proposed coding schemes that attain it.
In this paper we study the multi-input-single-output
(MISO) wiretap channel, where both the legitimate
receivers and the eavesdroppers channel take one of
ﬁnitely many values. We develop a new upper bound
on secrecy-rate that is tighter than the pairwise upper
bound and establishes that there is a loss in degrees of
freedom due to uncertainty of channel state information
at the transmitter. In addition we provide lower bounds
based on time-sharing and noise transmission strategies
and show that in some special cases these bounds can
be further improved using signal alignment and multi-
level coding strategies. While our analysis is restricted
to the MISO wiretap channel, we expect techniques
developed in deriving upper and lower bounds to be
applicable to related problems such as the compund
extension of the MIMO wiretap channel, the two
receiver broadcast channel with mutually conﬁdential
messages [9] and the multi-receiver broadcast channel
with an external wiretapper [12], [13]. We note that re-
cently signal and interference alignment schemes have
been used in the wiretap channel literature in e.g. [18]–
[20]. Secure degrees of freedom for the compound
wiretap channel are studied previously in [14]. The
expressions involve optimizing over certain subspaces
deﬁned by the channel vectors and do not take into
account techniques such as time-sharing, signal align-
ment or multi-level coding.
In the remainder of the paper, section II introduces
the channel model, section III considers the caseswhen there is no loss in degrees of freedom due to
channel uncertainty, section IV provides lower bounds
on achievable degrees of freedom whereas section V
establishes an upper bound on the secure degrees of
freedom.
II. CHANNEL MODEL
The model includes one transmitter with M anten-
nas, one receiver and one eavesdropper, each with one
antenna. The channels of the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper are given by,
y(t)=hTx(t)+v(t)
z(t)=gTx(t)+w(t)
t =1 ,2,...,n. (1)
where t denotes the time index, y and z denote the
channel output symbols at the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper respectively whereas h,g ∈ RM
denote the corresponding channel matrices of the le-
gitimate receiver and the eavesdropper respectively.
The additive noise variables are independent (across
users and time) and Gaussian with zero mean and unit
variance. We assume an average power constraint on
the input i.e., E[
￿n
t=1 ||x(t)||2] ≤ P, where || · ||
denotes the standard Eucledian norm.
We further assume that the channels matrices of the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper belong of a
ﬁnite set i.e.,
h ∈H= {h1,h2,...,hJr}
g ∈G= {g1,g2,...,gJe}
(2)
Unless we explicitly state otherwise, we assume that
H and G are such that any combination of M vectors
taken from either of the sets are linearly independent.
This assumption is satisﬁed for example if the channel
vectors are sampled from any continuous distribution.
The actual realization of h and g is known to the
respective receivers whereas only the sets H and G are
known to the remaining terminals. We use the notation
yj to denote the output at the receiver when h = hj
for j =1 ,2,...,J r. Similarly the notation zj denotes
the output at the eavesdropper when g = gj for j =
1,2,...,J e. Note that the compound wiretap channel
is equivalent to another scenario where there are a
total of Jr legitimate receivers, each interested in a
common message and Je non-colluding eavesdroppers.
The channel output of the jth legitimate receiver is
denoted by yj while that of the jth eavesdropper is
denoted by zj. We often use the term user to denote a
particular state of the receiver.
We will also use the notation where the transmit
vectors and received symbols are concatenated to-
gether i.e., X =[ x(1),...,x(n)] and likewise yj =
[yj(1),...,yj(n)], zk =[ zk(1),...,zk(n)] etc. In this
notation the channel (1) can be expressed as
yj = hT
j X + vj,j =1 ,...,J r
zk = gT
k X + wj,k =1 ,...,J e
(3)
A compound wiretap encoder maps a message m,
uniformly distributed over a set of size 2nR, to the
channel input sequence xn. The decoder produces
a message estimate ˆ mj = gj(yn
j ;hj). A rate R is
achievable if there exist a sequence of encoder and
decoders of such that Pr(m ￿=ˆ mj) → 0 as n →∞
for each j =1 ,2,...,J r and 1
nI(m;zn
j ) → 0 for
each j =1 ,2,...,J e. The largest rate achievable under
these constraints is the compound secrecy capacity. Of
particular interest is the degrees of freedom (d.o.f.) of
the compound wiretap channel. We say that d d.o.f. are
achievable on the compound wiretap channel, if there
exists a sequence of achievable rates R(P), indexed
by power P, such that
d =l i m
P→∞
R(P)
1
2 log2 P
. (4)
The maximum attainable value of d is the secrecy d.o.f.
of the compound wiretap channel.
III. CASES WHEN d =1
It is clear that even in absence of secrecy constraints
we can at-most attain 1 d.o.f. In this section we observe
that when min(Jr,J e) ≤ 1, it is indeed possible to
attain 1 d.o.f. We ﬁrst consider the case when Jr ≤ M
Proposition 1: When Jr <Mthe compound MISO
wiretap channel achieves full 1 degree of freedom.
Proof: When the number of legitimate receiver
channel states is less than M the matrix Hr =
[h1,...,hJr] is a low rank matrix. We can construct
A ∈ RM−Jr×M whose rows are mutually orthogonal
as well as orthogonal to the columns of Hr i.e.,
A · Hr =0 . Furthermore, since every eavesdropper
channel state gj is linearly independent of the columns
of Hr, we have that Agj ￿=0 , since the rank of
[h1,...,hJr,gj] exceeds Jr. As described below, by
transmitting noise symbols along the rows of the A
matrix we can thus ensure that the legtimate receiver’s
mutual information scales as 1
2 log2 P while the eaves-
dropper’s mutual information does not increase at this
rate.
Let u be any unit norm vector such that hT
i u ￿=0
for i =1 ,2,...,J r. The transmitted vector is:
x = us + ATn, (5)
where s ∼N (0,P 0) is the information bearing sym-
bol, where n ∼N (0,P 0IM−Jr) is a vector of noise
symbols transmitted in the common null-space of user
matrices and where P0 = P
M is selected to meet the
transmit power constraint. Accordingly the received
signals can be expressed as,
yi = hT
i x + vi (6)
= hT
i us + vi, (7)
and
zj = gT
j x + wj, (8)
= gT
j us + gT
j ATn + wj. (9)An achievable secrecy rate is given by [14]
R =m i n
i
I(s;yi) − max
j
I(s;zj) (10)
=m i n
i
1
2
log(1 + P0|hT
i u|2)
− max
j
1
2
log
￿
1+
P0|gT
j u|2
1+P0||Agj||2
￿
, (11)
which scales like 1
2 logP since ||Agj|| > 0 for each
j =1 ,2,...,J e and hT
i u > 0 for i =1 ,...,J r.
When there are fewer than M eavesdropping chan-
nels and an arbitrary number of legitimate receiver
channels we still achieve one d.o.f. by transmitting
information in the common null-space of the eaves-
dropper channels.
Proposition 2: When Je <Mthe compound MISO
wiretap channel achieves 1 d.o.f.
Proof: The matrix G =[ g1,g2,...,gJe] ∈
RM×Je is a low-rank matrix when Je <Mhence we
construct a matrix B ∈ RM−Je×M with orthogonal
rows such that B · G =0 . Further because each hi
is linearly independent of the columns of G, it must
have a component in the null space i.e., Bhi ￿=0for
i =1 ,...,J r. The transmitted vector is
x = BTm, (12)
where the information vector m ∼N (0,P 1I) is a
vector of i.i.d Gaussian symbols and P1 = P
M. Since
any information transmitted along rows of B will not
be seen by any eavesdropper, the resulting achievable
rate is:
R =m i n
i
I(m;yi) (13)
=m i n
i
1
2
log
￿
1+P1||Bhi||2￿
(14)
which scales as 1
2 logP as Bhi ￿=0for each i =
1,2,...,J r.
IV. LOWER BOUNDS: min(Jr,J e) ≥ M
The lower bound in Prop. 3 is based on selecting a
subset of receivers to serve or a subset of eavesdroppers
to hide the message against and time-sharing between
the choice of these subsets. It extends the techniques
in Prop. 1 and Prop. 2 to the case when min(Jr,J e) ≥
M.
Proposition 3: The following degrees of freedom
are achievable for the compound MISO wiretap chan-
nel when min(Jr,J e) ≥ M:
d =
M − 1
min(Jr,J e)
. (15)
Proof: We ﬁrst sketch how one achieves M−1
Jr
degrees of freedom by time-sharing across the set of
receivers.
1) Let T =
￿ Jr
M−1
￿
denote all possible subsets of
users of size M − 1. We label these subsets as
S1,...,ST. Note that each user belongs to T0 = ￿Jr−1
M−2
￿
subsets.
2) Let n be a sufﬁciently large integer. A message
m consists of nT0R0 information bits where
R0 =
1
2
log2 P − Θ, (16)
and where Θ is a sufﬁciently large constant,
(which will be speciﬁed later) that does not
grow with P. The message is mapped into
a codeword of a (T,T0) erasure code C i.e.,
m → (m1,m 2,...,m T) where each symbol mi
consists of nR0 information bits. Each receiver
retrieves the message m provided it observes any
T0 symbols. Furthermore as established in [2]
suitable inner code constructions exist such that
provided each of the T symbols are individually
protected, the overall message remains protected.
i.e.,
I(mt;z) ≤ nεn,∀t =1 ,...,T ⇒ I(m;z) ≤ Tnεn
(17)
The overall rate R = T0
T R0 results in the
following degrees of freedom:
d =
T0
T
=
￿Jr−1
M−2
￿
￿ Jr
M−1
￿
=
M − 1
Jr
as required.y
It remains to show how to transmit message mt
such that each user in a subset St decodes it with
high probability while satisfying I(mt;zj) ≤
nεn.
3) Each subset St is served over n channel uses.
The message mt is transmitted to M − 1 users
belonging to this subset along the lines of Prop. 1
i.e., by transmitting information symbols in the
common range space and noise in the common
null space of these users (c.f. (5))
xt = uts + atn, (18)
where at and ut are unit norm vectors such that
hT
i ut ￿=0and hT
i at =0for each i ∈S t and s
and n are information bearing and noise symbols
respectively.
Following the analysis leading to (11) we can
see that the following rate is achievable:
Rt =
1
2
logP − Θt,
Θt = −min
i∈St
1
2
log|hT
i ut|2+
max
j∈Jr
1
2
log
￿
1+
|gT
j ut|2
|aT
t gj|2
￿
,
(19)
where Θt is a constant that does not scale with
P. Furthermore we let Θ in (16) to be
Θ = max
t Θt. (20)4) With the choice of rate in (16) every user in
each subset St can decode the message mt with
high probability. Each user will have access to
T0 elements of the codeword (m1,...,mT) and
hence recover the original message m. Further-
more from the analysis in Prop. 1 it follows that
for j =1 ,2,...,J r and each t =1 ,...,T
I(mt;zj) ≤ nεn (21)
and hence from (17) it follows that I(m;zj) ≤
nTεn. Since εn can be made sufﬁciently small,
the secrecy condition is satisﬁed.
By time-sharing with respect to the eavesdroppers
the one can attain M−1
Je degrees of freedom as sketched
below.
1) We considers all possible Te =
￿ Je
M−1
￿
sub-
sets of M − 1 eavesdroppers and label them
as Se
1,...,Se
T e. Note that each eavesdropper
belongs to a total of Te
1 =
￿Je−1
M−2
￿
subsets.
2) Consider a parallel noise-less wiretap channel
consisting of Te links, where each link supports
a rate nR1, where
R1 =
1
2
logP − Ω (22)
and Ω is a sufﬁciently large constant that will
be speciﬁed later. Each eavesdropper is absent
on a total of Te
1 links while each legitimate
receiver observes all the Te links. Following the
scheme in [2] we can transmit a message m
of rate nR1Te
1 by mapping the message m →
(m1,...,mT e). The symbol mk, consists of nR1
bits and forms the input message on channel k.
3) For each choice of Se
t , we transmit information
in the common null-space of the eavesdroppers
in this selected set. Let bt be a vector such that
bT
t gj =0for each j ∈S e
t and transmit
xt = bts,
where s is the information bearing symbol. Since
each vector hi is linearly independent of any
collection of M−1 eavesdropper channel vectors
it follows that hT
i bt ￿=0 , and one can achieve a
rate
R1 =
1
2
log


1+ m i n
t∈{1,...,T
e}
i∈{1,...,Jr}
|hT
i bt|2P



≥
1
2
logP − Ω, (23)
where
Ω=− min
t∈{1,...,T
e}
i∈{1,...,Jr}
1
2
log|hT
i bt|2. (24)
With this choice of Ω, each receiver decodes each
of the messages m1,...,m T with high probabil-
ity. Furthermore, each of the eavesdropper does
not have access to T1 sub-messages correspond-
ing to the subsets St to which it belongs. By
virtue of our code construction, this ensures that
I(m;zj) ≤ nεn.
The overall achievable rate is given by R =
T
e
1
T eR1 and hence the achievable degrees of free-
dom are given by
d =
Te
1
Te =
￿Je−1
M−2
￿
￿ Je
M−1
￿ =
M − 1
Je
as required.
The time-sharing schemes in Prop. 3 can be further
improved using a variety of signal alignment schemes.
In our results below we assume that all the channel
in (1) are drawn by sampling a continuous distribution
and remain ﬁxed thereafter.
1) Signal Alignment:
Proposition 4: Consider a compound MISO wiretap
channel with M =2transmit antennas and Jr =3
states and Je ≥ 3. By aligning the signals of legitimate
receivers in a lower dimensional subspace, one can
achieve up to 1/2 degrees of freedom (almost surely).
Remark 1: We note that the time-sharing approach
in Prop. 3 achieves 1/3 d.o.f Thus the signal alignment
scheme can strictly improve the secrecy rate.
Proof: The suggested scheme involves coding
over an extension of two symbols. The channel ma-
trices over this extension are given by
Hi =
￿
hT
i 0
0h T
i
￿
,G j =
￿
gT
i 0
0g T
i
￿
(25)
and the corresponding received symbols, taken two at
a time, are expressed as
yi = Hix + vi, zj = Gjx + wj (26)
where yi and zj are length-two received vectors at the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper respectively,
the input x ∈ R4 is a length four vector and vi and wj
are length-two noise vectors. The basic idea is to force
each receiver to receive signal in a one dimensional
subspace by post multiplying the received symbols
with a length 2 vector i.e.,
˜ yi = rT
i Hix + rT
i vi
Signal alignment is used to select the vectors r1,r2,r3
in such a way that
rT
3 H3 ∈ span
￿
rT
1 H1,rT
2 H2
￿
. (27)
This can be accomplished for example by letting r3 to
be an arbitrary length 2 vector and selecting r1 and r2
as follows:
[ rT
1 rT
2 ]=rT
3 H3
￿
H1
H2
￿−1
. (28)
By virtue of (27) we have that
rank

 ˜ H =


rT
1 H1
rT
2 H2
rT
3 H3



 =2 (29)and hence there exist a two dimensional space deﬁned
by the matrix B ∈ R4×2 such that ˜ H·B =0 . The pro-
posed scheme sends noise along this subspace. Since
the channel vectors gj are sampled independently of
hi, we have that almost surely
rank(Gj · B) = rank
￿
gT
j b1
1 gT
j b1
2
gT
j b2
1 gT
j b2
2
￿
=2 (30)
where we have introduced
B =
￿
b1
1 b1
2
b2
1 b2
2
￿
.
Furthermore, let t be a vector such that rT
i Hit ￿=0
then the transmitted vector is of the form:
x = ts + Bn, (31)
where s ∼N(0, P
3 ) is the information bearing symbol
whereas n ∼N(0, P
3 I2) is a vector of noise symbols.
The received symbols at the legitimate receivers and
the eavesdroppers are given as:
˜ yi = rT
i Hits + rT
i vi
zj = Gjts + GjBn + w
(32)
An achievable rate for the compound wiretap chan-
nel is [14]
R =
1
2
￿
min
i
I(s;yi) − max
j
I(s;zj)
￿
(33)
where the factor of 1/2 appears because we are aggre-
gating two symbols to send each information symbol.
Our claim is complete once we show that
I(s;yj)=
1
2
logP + Θ(1) (34)
I(s;zj) = Θ(1) (35)
To establish (34) note that
I(s;yi)=h(yi) − h(yi|s)
=
1
2
log(1 +
P
3
|rT
i Hit|2
||ri||2 )
from which (34) follows since by construction
rT
i Hit ￿=0 . To establish (35) note that
I(s;zj)=h(zj) − h(zj|s)
=
1
2
logdet
￿
I +
P
3
Gjtt†G
†
j +
P
3
GjBB†G
†
j
￿
−
1
2
logdet
￿
I +
P
3
GjBB†G
†
j
￿
(36)
=
1
2
log
￿
1+
P
3
t†G
†
j
￿
I +
P
3
GjBB†G
†
j
￿−1
Gjt
￿
(37)
To show that (37) does not scale with P, we let
GjB = UjΛjV
†
j be the singular value decomposition
of GjB where Uj and Vj are unitary matrices and Λj
is a 2 × 2 diagonal matrix. Since GjB is full rank
(c.f. (30)), it follows that both the diagonal elements
of Λj are non-zero. Substituting in (37) we have that
I(s;zj)=
1
2
log
￿
1+
P
3
t†G
†
jU
†
j
￿
I +
P
3
ΛjΛ
†
j
￿−1
U
†
jGjt
￿
(38)
=
2 ￿
c=1
1
2
log
￿
1+
Pt2
c
3+Pλ2
c
￿
(39)
where we introduce t†G
†
jU
†
j =[ t1,t 2]. Since λc > 0,
this shows that I(s;zj) = Θ(1) as required.
2) Multi-level coding : In the previous section we
observed how one can leverage on interference align-
ment to improve the achievable degrees of freedom
compared to time-sharing. In the following section we
show how another technique, multi-level coding can
also improve achievable degrees of freedom. We will
restrict our attention to a speciﬁc example where h1 =
[1,1]†, h2 =[ 1 ,−1]†, g1 =[ 1 ,0]† and g2 =[ 0 ,1]†.
To get insights into the multi-level coding scheme,
we ﬁrst consider a simple example of deterministic
channels over F3.
Proposition 5: Consider a linear deterministic chan-
nel over F3 with two input symbols x1 and x2 and with
output symbols described as follows:
y1 = x1 + x2
y2 = x1 − x2
zi = xi,i =1 ,2
(40)
where the addition and subtraction is deﬁned over the
group in F3. Then we can achieve a secrecy rate of
R =1b/s for this channel.
Remark 2: We note that a time-sharing based rate,
analogous to Prop. 3, achieves a rate of 1
2 log2 3=
0.792 b/s. Thus the proposed rate is signiﬁcantly higher
than time-sharing. In the Gaussian example, a natural
extension of this scheme yields signiﬁcantly higher
degrees of freedom than time-sharing.
Proof: The key idea behind the proof is to enable
the legitimate receivers to take advantage of the ﬁeld
F3 in decoding while we limit the observation of the
eavesdroppers to binary valued symbols. The wiretap
code is illustrated below:
msg. (x1,x2)
0 (0,0),(1,1)
1 (0,1),(1,0)
(41)
When message bit 0 needs to be transmitted the sender
selects one of the two tuples (0,0) and (1,1) at ran-
dom and transmit the corresponding value of (x1,x2).
Likewise when bit 1 needs to be transmitted one of
the two tuples (0,1) and (1,0) will be transmitted.
Note that when b =0is transmitted y1 ∈{ 0,2} while
y2 =0whereas when b =1we have that y1 =1
and y2 ∈{ 1,2}. It can be readily veriﬁed that each
receiver is able to recover either message. Assuming
that the messages are equally likely, it can also be
readily veriﬁed that the message bit is independent ofboth x1 and x2 and thus the secrecy condition w.r.t.
each eavesdropper is satisﬁed.
To generalize the above coding scheme to the Gaus-
sian case we consider a natural multi-level extension.
Fix integers T and M with the following properties:
T is the smallest integer such that for a given ε>0,
Pr(maxi∈{1,2} |vi|≥3T−1) ≤ ε and M is the largest
integer such that 32M ≤ P/2. We now construct a
multi-level code with a rate of M −T information bits
and error probability at-most ε.
Let the information bits be represented by the vector
b =( bT,...,b M−1). For each i ∈{ T,...,M − 1},
we map the bit bi ∈{ 0,1} into symbols (˜ x1(i), ˜ x2(i))
according to the code construction in (41). The trans-
mitted symbols are given by
xk =
M−1 ￿
l=T
˜ xk(l)3l,k =1 ,2 (42)
and the received symbols at the two receivers can be
expressed as,
y1 =
M−1 ￿
l=T
˜ y1(l)3l + v1, y2 =
M−1 ￿
l=T
˜ y2(l)3l + v2
(43)
where we have introduced ˜ y1(l)=˜ x1(l)+˜ x2(l) and
˜ y2(l)=˜ x1(l) − ˜ x2(l).
With the choice of M, it follows that E[||x||2] ≤ P.
Furthermore in the analysis of decoding, we declare
an error if maxi |vi| > 3T−1. Conditioned on the fact
that the |vi| < 3T−1 for i =1 ,2 note that
yi − yi mod 3T−1 (44)
= yi −
￿
M−1 ￿
l=T
˜ yi(l)3 l
￿
mod 3T − v1 mod 3T (45)
= yi − v1 =
M−1 ￿
l=T
˜ yi(l)3 l. (46)
where we have used the fact that ￿￿M−1
l=T ˜ yi(l)3 l
￿
mod 3T =0 since each term
in the summation is an integer multiple of 3T.
Thus conditioned on the fact that |vi| < 3T−1 it is
possible to retrieve
￿M−1
l=T ˜ yi(l)3 l by computing (44).
Since there is no carry over across levels we in turn
retrieve (˜ yi(T),...,˜ yi(M)) at each receiver. Then ap-
plying the same decoding scheme as in Prop. 5 at each
level, each receiver can recover the underlying bits
(bT,...,b M). If however we have that |vi|≥3T−1,
then the above analysis leading to (46) fails and an
error is declared. Since T is selected to be sufﬁciently
large, this event happens with a probability that is less
than ε.
In order to complete the analysis it remains to
show that H(b|zi)=M − T. We ﬁrst enhance each
eavesdropper by removing the noise variable in (40)
i.e., ˜ zj = xj for j =1 ,2. Now consider
H(bT,...,b M|˜ zi)
=H(bT,...,b M|˜ xi(T),...,˜ xi(M))
=
M ￿
l=T
H(bl|˜ xi(l)) = M − T,
where the last relation follows from H(bl|˜ xi(l)) = 1
since we use the code construction in (41) in mapping
bl → (˜ x1(l), ˜ x2(l)).
The resulting d.o.f. achieved by the multi-level code
is given by
d =
R
1
2 logP
(47)
=
M − T
1/2(2M log2 3 + 1)
(48)
= log3 2+oM(1), (49)
where oM(1) → 0 as M →∞ . We summarize the
performance of the multi-level coding scheme below.
Proposition 6: For the MISO wiretap channel with
h1 =[ 1 ,1], h2 =[ 1 ,−1], g1 =[ 1 ,0] and g2 =[ 0 ,1],
the multi-level coding scheme can attain up-to
log 2
log 3 ≈
0.63 d.o.f.
Remark 3: We note that the achievable d.o.f. in
Prop. 6 are signiﬁcantly higher than those achieved by
the time-sharing lower bound in Prop. 3. We show in
the next section that an upper bound on secure d.o.f.
in this example is 2/3.
V. UPPER BOUND: min(Jr,J e) ≥ M
In what follows we develop an upper bound on the
rate of a compound wiretap code of length n. In this
section we establish the following upper bound on the
secure d.o.f.
Theorem 1: Consider a compound MISO wiretap
channel, provided that the channel states satisfy
min(Jr,J e) ≥ M, the secure degrees of freedom are
upper bounded by
d ≤ 1 −
1
M2 − M +1
(50)
We make a few remarks. Note that an immediate
upper bound on the compound wiretap channel is the
pairwise upper bound. This says that the capacity is
upper bounded by
C ≤ max
px
min
i,j
I(x;yi|zj) (51)
Intuitively this bound amounts to considering the upper
bound between each receiver-eavesdropper pair and
minimizing among all such pairs. To the best of our
knowledge this upper bound is the only bound known
for the compound wiretap channel and has been shown
to be tight in some special cases [2], [14], [15].
However for the MISO wiretap channel it can be easilyveriﬁed that this upper bound results in 1 secure d.o.f.
Note that with xsinN(0, P
MI)
I(x;yi|zj)=I(x;yi,zj) − I(x;zj) (52)
=
1
2
logdet
￿
I +
P
2
￿
hi
gj
￿
￿
hi gj
￿T
￿
(53)
−
1
2
log
￿
1+
P
2
||gj||2
￿
(54)
which yields 1 d.o.f.
A natural improvement of the pairwise upper bound
in (51) is to incorporate the fact that each receiver
wants a common message i.e.,
C ≤ max
px
min
i,j
min{I(x;yi|zj),I(x;yi)} (55)
however it can easily be veriﬁed that this potentially
tighter bound also yields 1 d.o.f. To get a tighter bound
in Thm. 1 we start from ﬁrst principles and carefully
combine the constraints imposed by the secrecy re-
quirements and the common message transmission.
The proof of the upper bound will be presented in
the full paper.
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